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Abstract. The paper provides anew (pre)kernel catcher in 
that the relevant set always contains the (pre)kernel. This 
new (pre)kernel catcher gives rise to a better lower bound 
5.** such that the kernel is included in strong e-cores for 
all real numbers 5 not smaller than the relevant bound 
5***. 
Zusammenfassung. Es wird eine/iul3ere Approximation 
des (Pr/i-)Kerns vorgestellt. Diese liefert eine bessere un- 
tere Schranke *** derart, dab der Kern in jedem starken 
5-Mark mite _> 5*** enthalten ist. 
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1. Introduction 
The solution part of cooperative game theory aims to 
solve the problem of how to allocate the overall profits of 
a joint enterprise to the participants. The various olution 
concepts prescribe somehow equitable divisions of the 
overall profits among the players in the game (which is 
the mathematical model of the joint enterprise). The core 
is considered to be one of the most important solution 
concepts for cooperative games. An allocation of the 
overall profits is said to belong to the core of a given 
game if no coalition (subset of players) has any incentive 
to object against he proposed allocation, that is the sum 
of all the allocations to the members of any coalition 
majorizes the worth of the coalition in the given game. 
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Unfortunately, core-allocations eed not to exist. Howev- 
er, if a cost of e is imposed on the formation of any non- 
trivial coalition in the game, then the notion of core- 
allocations can be replaced by so-called strong e-core-al- 
locations which are guaranteed to exist for large real 
numbers e. 
Another widely used approach in cooperative game 
theory is the concept called prekernel. An allocation of 
the overall profits is said to belong to the prekernel of a 
given game if each pair of players is in equilibrium con- 
cerning their mutual threats arising from the proposed 
allocation. A threat of one player against another player 
with respect o an allocation is determined by the maxi- 
mal gain that some coalition, containing one player but 
not the other, may achieve by withdrawing from the pro- 
posed allocation in favour of the worth of the coalition in 
the given game. It is known that prekernel allocations 
always exist. The kernel can be regarded as a generalized 
version of the prekernel. 
The intersection of the prekernel and the core was 
thoroughly studied in the context of assignment games 
(cf. [9]), bankruptcy games (cf. [1]), as well as some net- 
work flow games (cf. [5]). 
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979) established that 
the part of the (pre)kernel inside any strong e-core de- 
pends only on the latter's geometrical shape. That is, a 
strong e-core element belongs to the (pre)kernel if and 
only if it possesses the so-called bisection property, i.e., it 
is always the midpoint of a certain bargaining range be- 
tween each two players where each endpoint of the bar- 
gaining range is in the boundary of the strong 5-core. By 
choosing the real number 5large enough, the entire kernel 
is included in the strong 5-core and the above geometrical 
result can be regarded as a geometrical characterization 
of the entire kernel. Therefore it is worthwhile to provide 
lower bounds on 5 to guarantee that the kernel is included 
in strong 5-cores for all 5 not smaller than the relevant 
lower bound. Maschler et al. (1979) provided such a lower 
bound 5. on 5, but they were still interested in better lower 
bounds. Chang and Kan (1992) provided a better lower 
bound 5..  than 5.. The goal of this paper is to provide 
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a better lower bound 5.** than e**. Our lower bound 
e*** on 5 arises from a new (pre)kernel catcher which can 
be interpreted as an improvement of the so-called reason- 
able set being the (pre)kernel catcher used by Maschler 
etal. (1979). 
2. Definitions and notions 
This paper deals with cooperative games (N, v) in coali- 
tional form where the player set N = {1, 2, ..., n}, n _ 3, 
and so-called characteristic function v: 2N~IR satisfies 
v (0) : = 0. Any non-empty subset of N is called a coalition. 
Usually, the cooperative game (N, v) is identified with its 
characteristic function v. For the sake of notation, we 
write x(S) instead of 52 x~ for any xs~" ,  any SS2N\{0}, 
whereas x(0) := 0. ~s 
Let's recall several known notions and solution con- 
cepts. The sets of all pre-imputations and imputations 
respectively in the n-person game v are given by 
~--* (v) := {x s lR" lx  (N) = v (N)}, 
~-(v) := {xs J -* (v) lx ,  >_ v({i}) for all i sU} .  
The core of the game v and its interior are defined by 
Cd(v) := {xs J ' * (v ) lx (S )> v(S) for all SsZN\{0,U}}, 
cg~ := {xs~--* (v)[ x(S) > v(S) for all SsZN\{0, U}}. 
The excess of coalition S s 2 u with respect o the vector 
xslR" in the n-person game v is defined to be 
e" (S ,x ) :=v(S) -x (S )  whereas e~(0,x):=0. 
For any e s N, the strong e-core of the game v is given by 
cg~(v) := {xsJ*(v) le~(S,x)<_ 5 for all Ss2N\{0,N}}. 
Obviously, if5 = 0, then the notion of strong e-core agrees 
with the core. The maximum surplus of player i over 
another player j with respect o the pre-imputation x in 
the game v is defined to be 
si~(x) := max [e~ (S,x) l S s 2 ~, i e S, j qs- S] . 
We say player i outweighs player j with respect o the 
imputation x e Y-(v)if both x~ > v ({j}) and s~] (x) > s~] (x). 
The kernel ~ (v) of the game v is defined as the set of all 
imputations for which no player outweighs another play- 
er. Besides, the prekernel of the game v is given by 
c(*(v) :-- {xeY-*(v) ls,~(x) -- s;~(x) for all i, j sN ,  i r  
Maschler etal. (1979) proved that the parts of the kernel 
and the prekernel inside the core always coincide. To be 
precise, :/{ (v)ca cg~(v) = ~*  (v)ca ~ (v) for all e < 0. For a 
detailed treatment of all these notions and solution con- 
cepts, we refer to Driessen (1988, Chap. II). For any player 
i in the n-person game v, the notions of his largest contri- 
bution, his almost largest contribution and his almost 
smallest contribution, respectively, are defined to be 
r~ := max [v(Sw {i}) - v(S) lSs2  ~, i(~S], 
~ := max [v(Sw {i})-  v(S) lSe2  N, i r  r N\{i}], 
m~ := min [v(Sw {i}) - v(S)lSe2 ~, i~S, S ~ 0]. 
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For the sake of notation, write r ~ = (r~, r~ . . . . .  r, ~) s IR", 
-~ - -~ -~ -~ = (m~, m~, m. ~) s N& r ( r l , r  2. . . . .  r,)slR", and m v ..., 
The corresponding sets of all (pre-)imputations that give 
no player more (or less) than the relevant largest 
(smallest) contribution are given by 
~(v) := {xs~-* (v ) [x  i <_ r~ for all i sN} ,  
N(v) := {xsg'-*(v)[xi < ~ for all i sN} ,  
5fl (v) : = {x s 3- (v) I xl > m'/ for all i a N}. 
The so-called reasonable set 08 (v) was first introduced by 
Milnor (1952) and studied by Maschler etal. (1979) who 
proved that the reasonable set is a (pre)kernel catcher. 
That is, d (v) c 08 (v) and j4{. (v) ~ 08 (v) for any game v. 
Moreover, it is clear that cg(v) c08(v) because 
x, = v (N) - x (N~{i}) < v (N) - v (N~{i}) < r~ for all 
is N, all x s ~(v). The set ~ (v) was studied by Kikuta 
(1976), Funaki (1986) and Chang and Kan (1992) who 
proved the inclusion cC (v) c ~ (v)w ~o (v) for games v 
satisfying certain conditions. 
The goal of this paper is twofold. The first purpose is 
to provide a (pre)kernel catcher that is included in the 
reasonable set. In Sect. 3 it is established that the 
set ~(v)ucg~ is a (pre)kernel catcher. Evidently, 
(v) w cg0 (v) c 08 (v) because of cg0 (v) ccg (v) c 08 (v) as 
well as ~ (v) ~ 08 (v) which is due to the fact that ?y < r~ 
for all i sN.  The second purpose is to provide a lower 
bound 5*** on e such that the kernel is included in strong 
e-cores for all 5 > 5***. In Sect. 4 we present such a lower 
bound for a subclass of games by studying the chain of 
inclusions ~ (v) c (~ (v) ~ ~ (v)) w ~o (v) c cg~ (v). 
3. A new (pre)kernel catcher 
The next theorem states that any (pre-)imputation f the 
(pre)kernel belongs to the interior of the core or the set 
~(v) .  
Theorem 3.1. Y (v) c ~ (v) w ego (v) and o,~ff * (v) c ~ (v) 
w cs (v) for any game v. 
Proof. Let x e Y (v) w JC* (v). If x s ~o (v), then the rele- 
vant inclusion trivially holds. So, let x r ~o (v). In order to 
prove that x e N (v), suppose on the contrary that x ~ N (v). 
Then xl > ?~ for some i s N by definition of the set N (v). 
Now the definition of the real number ~ yields that 
xi > v (Su{ i})  - v(S) for all Se2 s with i(iS, S -r N~{i} 
or equivalently, 
ev(Sw{i},x)  <ev(S,x)  for all Se2  N 
with i(iS, S r N~{i}. (3.1) 
In particular, x~ > v ({i}) by choosing S = 0 and together 
with x s Y (v) w ~ff* (v), this implies that syi(x) <_ s~j(x) 
for all j eN\{ i} .  Choose player ksN\{ i}  such that 
s~i (x) = max [sy~ (x) I js N\{i}I and next, choose any coali- 
tion Te2 N satisfying is  T, kq~ T, eV (T,x) = S~k(X ). In case 
Tva {i}, it follows from (3.1) that 
syi(x) > e"(T~{i},x) > e~(T,x) = S~k(X) > Sy,(X) > S~.,(X) 
for all j e  T\{i}. 
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That is, we arrive at a contradiction whenever T ~ {i}. It 
remains to consider the case T= {i}. Now we obtain that 
s~ (x) _< s~ (x) _< si~, (x) = e v ({i}, x) = v ({i}) - x~ < 0 
for all j tX \{ i} .  
From s~(x) < 0 for a l l j tN \{ i} ,  we deduce that 
v(S) -  x (S )  < 0 for all j tN \{ i} ,  
all S t 2 u with j ~ S, i q~ S. 
This yields that v (S) - x (S) < 0 for all S e 2 u satisfying 
ir S r  0. In addition, this result together with (3.1) 
implies that 
v(S)  - x (S )  = e~(S,x) < e~ (S \{ i} ,x )  < 0 
for all St2  N, i tS ,  S ~ N,  S ~ {i}. 
Remark that also v({i})-x~ < 0. We conclude that 
v (S) < x (S) for all S e 2u\{0, N}. This, however, contra- 
dicts the assumption x r (go (v). In any case we arrive at a 
contradiction which completes the proof of the theo- 
rem. []  
The (pre)kernel catcher ~ (v) w (go (v) mentioned in the 
above theorem should be considered as an improvement 
of the (pre)kernel catcher N (v) presented by Maschler 
etal. (1979). In order to illustrate the relationship 
(v) u (go (v) ~ N (v) between both (pre)kernel catchers, 
let's treat the example involving the 3-person game v 
defined by v (N)= 1 and v (S)=0 for all St2U\{N}. 
Then r~ = 1, ~ = 0 for all i t  N, so ~ (v) = 0 and 
~(v)  = {xt IR  ~ [x~ + x~ + x3 = 1, x~ < 1, x~ < 1, x3 < 1} 
= conv {(1, 1, - 1), (1, - 1, 1), ( -  1, 1, 1)}, 
(g(V) ---- {xe~x 3 Ix~ + x2 + X 3 : 1, Xl >-- O, x 2 > O, X 3 >" O} 
=conv {(1, 0, o), (o, 1, o), (o, o, ~)}. 
Notice that the set ~(v) may be empty, whereas the rea- 
sonable set r is always nonempty (without proof). 
4. Kernel catchers in terms of strong ~-cores 
This section is devoted to conditions on the real number 
e that guarantee that the strong e-core contains the ker- 
nel. The approach to include the kernel in some strong 
t-core is strongly based on Chang and Kan's result that, 
under certain circumstances, any imputation of the kernel 
belongs to the interior of the core or the set ~(v). 
Theorem 4.1. (cf  [2], page 90) Let v be a zero-normalized 
game (i.e., v ({i}) = O for  all ie  N)  satisfying v (S) <_ v (N) 
for  all S t 2 N. Then 
Yf  (v) ~ 2 ~ (v) ~ (go (v) . 
In the final stage of their research on the kernel of such 
games, Chang and Kan (1992) provided some critical 
number e** (v) in such a way that the inclusions 
x (v) = (~ (v)u (go (v))n ~ (v) ~ % (v) 
hold for all E _> e** (v). 
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See also Remark 4.4. Our final goal is to provide a better 
lower bound on e for such games that ensures that the 
strong e-core contains the kernel. The improvement ofthe 
lower bound on e will be obtained from the replacement 
of the reasonable set ~(v) by the new kernel catcher 
(v) u (go (v). That is, we examine the inclusion 
(~  (v) ~ (go (v)) n (~ (v) u (go (v)) = %(v). 
In this context, we introduce for an arbitrarily zero-nor- 
malized game v the critical number e***(v) as follows. 
Write ~+ instead of max [0, ~] for any c~ t IR. 
I max min [v(S),v(S) - m~(S),v(S) 
Sr - v(N) + f~(NkS)] if (g(v) = 0, 
max min [[min [v(S), v(S) - m~(S)]] +, 
e*** (v) = s,0.N [v(S) - v(N) + f~(NkS)]+] 
if (g (v) r 0, 5~ (v) ~ 0 and ~ (v) r 0, 
0 i f (g (v ) r  
Theorem 4.2. Let v be a zero-normalized game. Then 
(S f (v ) r~(v) )~(g(v )  ~ (g~(v) for all e >_ e***(v). 
Proof. Let xt (2 ' (v )n~(v) )u (g(v )  and St2Nk{0,N}. If 
x t (g(v), then x (S) > v(S). If x E 2~  (v), then x~ _> m~ for all 
i eN ,  so x(S)>m'(S)  and moreover, x(S)>O since 
x i >_ v({i}) = 0 for all i tN .  If x t~(v) ,  then x i _< ~ for all 
ie  N, so x(S) = v(N) - x (NkS)  >_ v(N)  - ~"(NkS). In or- 
der to show that v(S) - x(S) < e for all e >_ e***(v), we 
distinguish three cases involving the sets (g(v), ~e(v) and 
~(v). 
Case one. Suppose that (g(v)= 0. Then x~e(v)n~(v)  
implies x(S) > O, x(S) >_ mY(S) as well as x(S) > v(N)  
- ?V(N\S). Hence x(S) > max [O, mV(S),v(N) -- ~"(N\S)] 
and consequently, 
v(S) - x(S) < min [v(S), v(S) - m~(S), v(S) - v(N) 
+ ?~(NkS)] < e*** (v). 
Case two. Suppose that (g(v) -r 0, Lf(v) r 0 and ~(v) r 0. 
Then x t s (v) w (g (v) implies 
x(S) > rain [v(S), max [0, mY(S)]]. 
Furthermore, x(S) >_ min[v(S), v(N) - PV(NkS)] because 
of x t ~(v) w (g(v). Now it follows that 
x(S) > max [rain [v (S), max [0, mY(S)]], 
rain [v (S), v (N) - P~ (N\S)]] 
and consequently, 
v(S) - x(S) <_ rain [[rain [v (S), v(S) - mY(S)]]+, 
[v(S) - v(N) + ~'(N\S)]+] _< e*** (v). 
Case three. Suppose that cg(v)50 and (s162 0 or 
N(v)=0). Then xe(g(v)  implies v(S) -x (S )<_O 
<_e***(v). In any case, v(S) -x (S )<_e*** (v )  for 
all St2Nk{0, N} and therefore, xe(g~(v) for all 
e_> ~*** (v). [] 
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Corollary 4.3. Let  v be a zero-normalized game satisfying 
v(S) <_ v(N) for all S~2 N. Then 
W(v) ~ cg~(v) for all ~ > e***(v). 
Proof Combine Chang and Kan's  result with Theorem 
3.1 and apply Theorem 4.2. That  is, we have 
(v) ~ (_~ (v) ~ ~o (v)) ~ (~ (v) w ~o (v)) 
= (~(v)  ~ ~ (v)) ~ ~o (v) = (~(v)  ~ ~ (v)) ~ ~(v) ~ % (v) 
for all e_> e***(v). []  
Remark4.4. For zero-normal ized games v satisfying 
v(S) < v(N) for all S~2 N, Chang and Kan  (1992) estab- 
lished in a similar way that ~(v)~ (s176 
c~ N (v) ~ cg~ (v) for all e > e** (v) where the critical number  
e** (v) is defined by 
max min [v(S), v(S) - mv(S), v(S) - v(N) 
Sr 
+ r~(N\S)] if Cg(v) = O, 
max rain [v (S), [v (S) - m ~ (S)] +, 
e**(v) = s~o,N v(S) - v(N) + rV(N\S)] 
if C~(v) r 0 and A ~ (v) r O, 
max min [0, v(S), v(S) - v(N) + r ' (N \S ) ]  
s~0,~ if ~r = 0. 
Let's clarify, without going into technical details, why the 
new lower bound s*** (v) is better than the above lower 
bound e**(v). The inequality e***(v)_< e**(v) is mainly 
due to the facts that ~[_ r [  for all JaN as well as 
v(S) - v(N) + r~(N\S) >_ 0 for all S e2n\{0,  N}. In fact, if 
~(v )  = 0, then e** (v) is simply equal to zero (e.g., choose 
S= {i} where v({i})= 0). In addition, be aware that 
cO(v) ~ 0 whenever ~C~(v) = 0 or ~(v)  = 0. Involving the 
proofs of some of these statements, see the appendix. 
A. Appendix 
Lemma A.1. Let S62N\{O,N}. Then we have 
(i) ?~(S) > v(S) and r~(N\S) >_ v(N) - v(S) >_ m~(N\S). 
(ii) ?V(N) >_ v(N) iff ~(v) ~ O. 
r~(N) > v(N) iff ~(v) % O. In fact, ~(v) ~ 0 always. 
(iii) ~(v) = 0 implies cg~ ~ 0 and m~(N) > v(N) implies 
~:o (v) # O. 
Proof (i) Let Se2N\{O,N}. Write S={i~,i2,..., i~} 
where i 1 < i  2 <. . .< i~ and N\S= {Jl,Jz,...,J,-~} 
. . . .  v where A <J2 <. . .< J . -~ .  Then r~_v({ i l}  ) and 
r~_v({h, t2  ..... tk}) - v({h,~2 ..... ~k-1}) for all 2 < k _< s. 
From this it follows that 
?v(S) = ~ ?~. > v({il,i 2 ..... i~}) = v(S). 
z k - -  
k=l  
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We have that r ~. > v(N) -  v(N\{j~})> m ~. as well as 
J1 - -  J1  
r~ > v(N\{jx,J2, , Jk -1})- -  v(N\{j i , J2,  ,Jk}) > m~" J k  . . . . . . . .  J k  
for all 2 < k _< n - s. F rom this it follows that 
n- -s  n - - s  
r~(N\S) = ~ r ~. > v(N) - -v (S)  > ~ m ~ = m~(N\S).  
J~"  - -  - -  3k  
k=l  k=l  
(ii) Obviously, if ~(v)  r 0, choose any xe~(v) ,  so x i < 
for all i eN  and hence, v(N)=x(N)<<_f~(N). Con- 
versely, if f~(N)>v(N) ,  then it is evident that  
/~ + [v(N) - F(N)]  eie~(v) for all i6N. Here de]R" de- 
notes the i-th unit vector in IR" defined by e l :=  1 and 
e s := 0 for al l jeN\{ i} .  In a similar way, one shows that 
N(v) # 0 iff rqN)  _> v(N). It turns out, however, that the 
inequality r~(N) > v(N) always holds because the proof  
of part (i) concerning the vector r ~ also applies with S = 0. 
(iii) Suppose that ~(v)  = 0 or equivalently, ~V(N) < v(N). 
Define the vector ye lR"  by Yi := ?[ + n-X Iv(N) - YV(N)] 
for all ieN.  Then we have y (N)= v(N) as well as 
y(S) > ~(S)> v(S) for all Se2N\{0 ,N} where the latter 
inequality follows from part (i). Hence, y 9 W ~ (v) and thus, 
ego (v) ~ 0 whenever N (v) = 0. 
Suppose now that m~(N)> v(N). Define the vector 
z elR" by z i :=  m[ + n-1 [v(N) - m~(N)] for all ie  N. Then 
we have z (N)=v(N)  as well as z (S)>mv(S)+v(N)  
- m~(N) = v(N) - mqN\S)  >_ v(S) for all SeZN\{0 ,N} 
where the latter inequality follows from part (i). Hence, 
z e (g0 (v) and thus, ego (v) r 0 whenever m ~ (N) > v (N). []  
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